In Euthyphro, the central question Socrates sought to address was?
Are the rules of good conduct good in themselves, i.e., intrinsically good, or are they good simply because they happen to be adopted by the deities, i.e., extrinsically good?
The former view implies that ethical rules are absolute, the latter implies tha
Possible criteria of Personhood
Warren: Reasoning capacity, self-awareness, ability to communicate, etc.
Tooley: Having a concept-of-self
Brody: Brain Waves
Ramsey: Gene structure
Noonan: "Conceived-of-humans
English's criteria of personhood
Biological factors: descended from humans, having a certain genetic make-up, having a head, hands, arms, eyes, capable of locomotion, breathing, eating, sleeping," etc.
"Psychological factors: sentience, perception, having a concept of self and of one's
Warren maintains that there are two distinct senses of the term "human":
the moral sense and the genetic sense.
Genetic sense: "Any member of the species is a human , and no member of any other species could be."
Moral sense "A full-fledged member of the moral community.
Warren argues that Noonan must demonstrate that :
Warren argues that Noonan must demonstrate that "whatever is genetically human is also morally human."
Warren maintains, however, that genetic humanity is not a sufficient condition for moral humanity.
Warren argues for an alternative way of defining the
Warren stipulates that there are five central traits of personhood:
(1) "Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular, the capacity to feel pain."
(2) Reasoning (of a fairly complex kind)
(3) Self-motivated activity
(4) "Capacity to communicate, by whatever means" on an in
What are two crucial problem with Warren's list of criteria?
(1) "Formulating precise definitions of these criteria.
(2) Applying these criteria to particular cases.
Warren stresses that:
"We needn't suppose that an entity must have all of these attributes to be properly considered a person." (1-2 might suffice)
"N
Warren argues that: "All we need to claim, to demonstrate that a fetus is not a person, is that any being which satisfies none of 1-5 is certainly not a person."
Warren views this as self-evident.
She argues that if we do not view this claim as obvious it is either because we have "no notion at all of what a person is," or we are confusing this notion with that of a human being (in the genetic sense).
Upon the view that 1-5 are the fundamental criteria for personhood , genetic humanity constitutes neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for viewing some entity "x" as a person.
It follows from this that.....
some human beings are not people," and it may be the case that there exist other entities that are not human beings, but are still people.
What implications does this view have?
Warren maintains that:
A man or woman whose consciousness has been permanently obliterated but who remains alive is a human being which is no longer a person."
"Defective human beings, with no appreciable mental capacity, are not and presumably never will be people.
Warren maintains that "to ascribe full moral rights to an entity which is not a person is as absurd as to....
.... ascribe moral obligations and responsibilities to such an entity.
What would Warren say to "To what extent does the fact that a fetus has the potential for becoming a person endow it with some of the same rights.
The more like a person, in the relevant respects, a being is, the stronger the case for regarding it as having a right to life."
Just as "the human individual develops biologically in a continuous fashion...the rights of a person might develop in the sam
A fetus may be viewed as a potential person.
Does a potential person have a right to life?
Warren's response:
Even if a potential person does have some prima facie right to life, such a right could not possibly outweigh the right of a woman to obtain an abortion, since the rights of any actual person invariably outweigh those of any potential person, whenever th
Noonan: What is the most fundamental question in the history of thought on abortion?
How do you determine the humanity of a being?
Noonan: How did theologians answer that question?
Under the heading of 'ensoulment'. This can be translated outside of the theological context just by substituting 'human' for 'rational soul'.
The answer they gave can be seen as a refusing to discriminate among human beings on the basis of their varying
Noonan: What are four rival answers to the question, When does a fetus become a human being? Why does Noonan reject each of them?
Viability --> R
Noonan: What does Noonan say about the relevance of probabilities in the assessment of whether a fetus will become a fully formed human being?
...
Singers's conditions for the changing of prejudicial attitudes:
The need to expand our "moral horizons."
We should question our most fundamental attitudes and practices.
Singer advocates :
extending the basic principle of equality to non-human animals."
We ought to recognize the "rights of animals."
We must consider the extent to which the case for equality between men and women can be extended to nonhuman animals.
We should recognize, how
Singer stresses that
Singer stresses that "the basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration."
"Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights."
Thus it may be rational
What does Singer's principle require?
The principle requires that the attitude of speciesism must be condemned.
Sentience:
Bentham maintains that the capacity for suffering and/or enjoying is the crucial characteristic "that gives a being the right to equal consideration"; non-arbitrary.
The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all."
If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for....
Refusing to take that suffering into consideration."
Thus Singer concludes that "the limit of sentience ... is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others.
Cohen's argument
Using animals as research subjects in medical investigations is widely condemned on two grounds: first, because it wrongly violates the rights of animals, and second, because it wrongly imposes on sentient creatures much avoidable suffering. Neither of t
Cohen maintains the following.
A Right: "A claim, or potential claim, that one party may exercise against another."
"To comprehend any genuine right fully...we must know who holds the right, against whom it is held, and to what it is a right.
How does Cohen qualify the definition of "rigt
A right is "a claim or potential claim" that can be made in "a community of moral agents."
Cohen then argues that, upon this view, only human beings (persons) can make such claims against one another; therefore only human beings are members of this commun
Kant (Animal Rights) Act as to treat humanity, both in your own person, and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means.
Basically, this means that we should respect people by not using them in ways they would not consent to. We should respect people because they are autonomous: Autonomy is the freedom that human beings have to pursue their own ends (goals). Kant believed t
Therefore, only human beings have rights.
What are the characteristics of human nature that give rise to their ability to be moral agents?
Different philosophers have described it in different ways.
One of the most influential thinkers on this matter has been Kant: All human beings possess "a uniquely moral will"; and the use of this will makes them morally autonomous beings.
Humans confront moral choices, establish moral laws (for themselves and als
Moral acts have an ____ in addition to an ________
Moral acts have an internal dimension in addition to an external dimension.
The external dimension is the behavioural act; the internal dimension is the awareness and intent in the mind of the agent.
lacking this internal dimension an animal can never "co
Cohen defends speciesism on the grounds that
biomedical research must still proceed."
Cohen admits that animals "ought not to be made to suffer needlessly."
He rejects, however, the assumption that "all sentient animals have equal moral standing.
Cohen claims to be presenting a utilitarian argument in defense of his position, even though he begins with Kantian concepts.
The Ad Hominem Argument: Defenders of animal rights are not consistent in what they profess and what they practice. To be consistent would be intolerable; the cost for humanity is far too high.
Total consistency would require not only refraining from usin
Kant (Animal Rights) "Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. The end is man.
Thus, we have no direct duties to animals. That is, we have no duty to respect or foster the ends of animals. However:
"If any acts of animals are analogous to human acts and spring from the same principles, we have duties towards the animals because thus
Kant (Animal Rights) "If he is not to stifle his own feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals.
Kant's contention was that cruelty to animals leads to cruelty to humans. Thus, it is in the self-interest of humanity to treat animals humanely, at least most of the time. Kant's view was that we should refrain from pointless cruelty to animals. Since an
Kant (Animal Rights) "Vivisectionists, who use living animals for their experiments, certainly act cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must be regarded as man's instruments; but any such cruelty f
Note that Kant recognizes here that animals do suffer. This distinguishes him from those who believed that animals are unfeeling automatons.
According to Kant, Cruelty to animals is justified in cases where the benefits to humans outweigh the harm to huma
What does Kant say about judicial or juridicial punishment and what reason does he offer?
According to Kant's philosophy of law, Judicial or "juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good, either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because
Kant says that just punishment of a person must be preceded by _______
and that punishment must not have anything to do with _________
Although no person may lose their inborn personality, their crime may warrant their losing their civil personality.
Just punishment of a person must be preceded by the verification that person's guilt.
Punishment must not have anything to do with achievin
Kant maintains that the penal law is a _________
Kant maintains that "the penal law is a categorical imperative."
No advantage of utilitarianism "may discharge him from the justice of punishment, or even from the due measure of it."
"For if justice and righteousness perish, human life would no longer ha
So why keep criminals alive who have been "condemned to death" for the purpose of, say, using them as experimental subjects in order to benefit society?
What is Kant's reply?
Nothing can serve as a substitute for justice - regardless of how much utility it may have.
Retributivism is grounded in ________
Retributivism is grounded in the principle of equality.
It is "the right of retaliation" (jus talionis) - "like with like.
The principle of equality as it applies to the concept of retributivism is the only principle that can ______
This principle is the only one that can "definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty."
Kant claims that this is the only appropriate standard of punishment; all other standards are unstable and uncertain.
He maintains that "the u
What does Kant mean when he says "If you steal from another, you steal from yourself.
This is understood to mean that "whoever steals anything makes the property of all insecure; he therefore robs himself of all security in property, according to the right of retaliation."
Kant suggests a variety of types of punishment for various crimes,
Kant's position on punishment for murder:
There is no substitute but death. "Whoever has committed murder must die."
Though Kant firmly maintains that the death should be brought about in a humane manner.
Refraining from inflicting the death penalty on a person who has committed murder has the ef
Issues for consideration on Kant's retributivist position:
The role of "mercy".
How do the notions of "free will" and "responsibility" fit into the picture?
Does Kant exaggerate our freedom?
Can it be argued that at least some crimes are committed because of factors of which one may not be in full control?
The appeal of retributive justice
Rests in part on it's intuitive appeal. Most would agree that wrongful acts, especially serious ones, should be punished even if the punishment produces no other good.
Traditional utilitarian view of punishment
The ultimate purpose of punishment must be to promote happiness or lessen unhappiness. Since crime causes unhappiness, punishment is justified, when it is justified at all, insofar as it controls or reduces crime -- through special and general deterrence,
In what two senses can retributivism be thought of
In a broad sense, retributivism is the view that whether a person may be punished and, if so, o what extent are questions to be decided solely by reference to one's past legal sense.
1. The act of committing a legal offense is the necessary and sufficient
English (Animal Rights)
It is wrong to torture and inflict suffering on animals for no reason. It is wrong period. Even though dogs and birds do not have the same rights persons do. However, few people think it is wrong to use dogs as experimental animals, causing them considera
English on Kant's account of animal rights and the Utilitarian calculate of animal rights
She disagrees with Kant where the torturing of animals is not morally wrong since the sensibilities of the torturer would not be warped or cause him to mistreat people if he died right after. And she diagrees with the Utilitiarian calculate of the sum of
English's position on Rawl's original position to make the mistreatment of animals wrong
She argues, if our moral rules allowed people to treat person-like non-persons in ways that a person would not like to be treated, she thinks that this would undermine the system of sympathies and attitudes that makes the ethical system work.
She argues s
English on Tooley's argument of drowning kittens
Since kittens get their rights second-hand, via the need for coherence in our attitudes, their interests are often overridden by the interests of full-fledged persons. But if their survival would be no inconvenience to people at all, then it is wrong to d
English's Conclusion
That the application of our concept of a person will not suffice to settle the abortion issue. After all, the biological development of a human being is gradual. Second, whether a fetus is a person or not, abortion is justifiable early in pregnany to avoi
Why is a 'coherence of attitudes' for English, enough to make the similarity of a fetus to a baby very significant?
A fetus one week before birth is so much like a newborn baby that it is psychologically unacceptable to allow a cavalier treatment of the former while expecting full sympathy and nurturative support for the latter.
English on Rawl's theory of Original position. Explain it's relevance to the problem of extending our ethical theory beyond what is required
English thinks that Rawl's theory is consequentialist, but with it's teleology operating on a higher level than say the consequences of the Utilitarian calculate of consequences.
She says that in choosing the principles to regulate society from the origin
Cohen's argument that animals don't have rights:
1) A right is a claim that one party may exercise against another.
2) Rights exist only among beings who can make moral claims against one another.
3) The attributes of human beings that give rise to their ability to make moral claims against others are l
Objection to Cohen "If having rights requires being able to make moral claims, to grasp and apply moral laws, then many humans -- the brain-damaged, the comatose, the senile -- who plainly lack those capacities must be without rights. But that is absurd.
This objection fails; it mistakenly treats an essential feature of humanity as though it were a screen for sorting humans...The issue is one of kind. Humans are of such a kind that they may be the subject of experiments only with their voluntary consent.
A second objection, also often made, may be paraphrased as follows:
"Capacities will not succeed in distinguishing humans from the other animals. Animals also reason; animals also communicate with one another; animals also care passionately for their youn
This criticism misses the central point. It is not the ability to communicate or to reason, or dependence on one another, or care for the young, or the exhibition of preference, or any such behavior that marks the critical divide. ... Actors subject to mo
Peter Singer, "All Animals are Equal
Speciesism: The belief that the interests of (a member of) one's own species count for more than the interests of (a member of) another species.
Singer likens "speciesism" to racism and sexism. He asks: What is the ethical basis for opposition to racism a
The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is both necessary and sufficient for having interests.
For Singer, a being has rights if and only if it has interests; it need not have autonomy, membership in a community, the ability to respect the rights of others, a sense of justice, etc.
Singer's view seems to be that what matters is not who or what suff
Singer concludes that "speciesism" is unjustified.
What follows is not that animals have the same rights as humans, but that their interests should be given equal consideration. Because they have different capacities they will have different rights. "Since dogs can't vote, it is meaningless to talk of the
Singer's main argument:
1) Suffering is intrinsically bad.
2) If suffering is intrinsically bad, then what is morally relevant is not who or what suffers, but the suffering itself.
3) Therefore, the suffering of all beings is deserving of equal consideration.
4) Therefore, we ou
Question for Singer who follows the lead of Bentham.
Singer follows the lead of Jeremy Bentham. But Mill contended that the higher faculties give rise to higher quality pleasures. Higher quality pleasures count for much more than lower quality. Since humans, but not animals, are capable of higher quality pl
Warren- Traits which are most central to the concept of personhood or humanity in the moral sense
1. Consciousness
2. Reasoning
3. Self-motivated activity
4. The capacity to communicate, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics
5. Self awarene
Warren
It is true that the claim that x is a human being is more commonly voiced as part of an appeal to treat x decently than is the claim that x is a person, but this is either because 'human being' is here used in the sense which implies personhood, or becau
Warren "If (1)-(5) are indeed the primary criteria of personhood then ______
It is clear that genetic humanity is neither necessary not sufficient for establishing that an entity is a person
Warren "Thus in the relevant respects, a fetus, even a fully developed one, is _____
Considerably less person-like than is the average mature mammal, indeed the average fish"
The right to life does not follow from virtue of potential - even if it did such a right could not outweigh the right of a woman to obtain an abortion, since the ri
Noonan argues against viability as the criterion because ____
The newborn and infirm would ten we non persons, since they cannot live without the aid of others.
Foes of abortion propose sufficient conditions for personhood which fetuses satisfy, while friends of abortion counter with necessary conditions for personhood which fetuses lack.
English says "Rather ____
Rather, "person" is a cluster of features, of which rationality, having a self concept and being conceived of humans are only part.
There is no single core of necessary and sufficient features which we can draw upon with the assurance that they constitute
English's criticism of affirming the consequent
It is fallacious to state that a necessary condition for personhood and showing that a fetus had that characteristic. Some have mistakenly reasoned from the premise that a fetus is human to the conclusion that is is a human. Adding an equivocation on "bei
English's criticism of anti abortionist's pointing out resemblances
They emphasize it's development ("It already has ten finger....") without mentioning its dissimilarities to adults (it still has girls and a tail)
English's criticism of varying opinion of the specific time or moment one becomes a person
Biologically, a human being develops gradually. We shouldn't expect there to be any specific time or sharp dividing point hen a person appears on the scene.