Singer's weak principle (in 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality')
Uses the example of giving money to aid organizations instead of buying new clothes to illustrate what significant means
2-w. If we can prevent a bad thing without sacrificing something of significant moral importance, then we are morally required to prev
Singer's strong principle (in 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality')
A sacrifice of comparable moral importance gets to the point where only marginally better than the suffering people (much more extreme than weak moral principle)
2-s. If we can prevent a bad thing without sacrificing something of comparable moral importan
The pond case
I ask them to imagine that their route to the university takes them past a shallow pond. One morning, I say to them, you notice a child has fallen in and appears to be drowning. To wade in and pull the child out would be easy but it will mean that you get
Singer's argument for the conclusion that we ought to donate significant amounts to aid organizations
1-s. Suffering in the third world is a bad thing.
2-s. If we can prevent a bad thing without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, then we are morally required to prevent the bad thing.
3-s. We can prevent a bad thing without sacrificing s
Moral code (in Arthur's sense)
Our moral code is a codified version of what we believe about morality.
"My first concern, then, is to assess such arguments on their own terms, asking whether these argument do, in fact, establish a duty to give aid. I will argue, in response, that our m
The ideal moral code
The ideal moral code promotes the best consequences and has entitlements and just deserts (being allowed to keep what you earn), but not the greater evil moral principle. There are certain bad consequences of adopting the greater evil moral principle that
Arthur's ideal code consequentialism
The ideal moral code promotes the best consequences (not a case by case deliberation of best consequences, but rather an entire code based on this)
Arthur's argument that we should drop Singer's principles
But there is also another idea which Singer ignores: the idea of entitlements - that I have rights or may justly deserving something - and these are also morally significant. For example, we could help others is by giving away body parts. While your life
Moral v. biological persons
Moral persons have the same rights as fully capacitated adults such as life, whereas biological persons have human DNA, but don't have these rights. (A cell itself can be biologically human in that it has our genes, but can't be a moral person.)
Why biological personhood is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral personhood
In order to be a moral person, you have to have the concept of a subject that has temporally unified experiences and you have to believe that you're a subject like this.
He thinks this is necessary because in order to have a right to x, you have to desire
Tooley's argument that fetuses are not moral persons
Fetuses and small infants can't have the desire to continue to exist in the way they currently do. They can't have this desire because they lack the concepts necessary for having this desire. Since they lack the relevant desire, they can't have the right
The Potentiality Principle (from Tooley)
If organism O has the potential to grow into an organism that has the right to life through normal development, then organism O has the right to life.
When combined with the claim that fetuses do have relevant potential, you get the claim that fetuses alw
Tooley's Moral Symmetry principle
Suppose that causal process C leads to outcome E. A is an action that initiates C, whereas B is an action that requires minimal effort that stops process C before E obtains. The Moral Symmetry principle states that there's no morally relevant difference b
Tooley's cats/super-cats example
Super-cats possess the same traits as adult humans. A chemical injection is developed to turn cats into super-cats (cats don't have the right to life and super-cats do). A regular cat is injected with the chemical and has not yet developed into a super-ca
Tooley's argument against the potentiality principle
If the Moral Symmetry principle is true, then it's permissible to kill the cat now because it would be a way of intervening with the process of turning the cat into a super-cat. Given the Moral Symmetry principle, intervening is permissible if it's permis
The FLO theory of wrongful killing
Killing is wrong when it deprives the victim of future life (future like ours), which certainly applies to abortion.
If a killing deprives the victim of a future like ours, then, other things being equal, that killing is wrong.
The killing of most fetuses
The considered judgment argument
The FLO account of the wrongness of killing is correct because it fits with our considered judgment concerning the nature of the misfortune of death. The analysis of the previous section is an exposition of the nature of this considered judgment. This ju
The worst of crimes argument
The FLO account of the wrongness of killing is correct because it explains why we believe that killing is one of the worst of crimes. My being killed deprives me of more than does my being robbed or beaten or harmed in some other way because my being kil
The appeal to cases argument
The FLO account of the wrongness of killing is correct because it yields the correct answers in many life-and-death cases that arise in medicine and have interested philosophers. Consider medicine first. Most people believe that it is not wrong deliberat
The analogy with animals argument
Why do we believe it is wrong to cause animals suffering? We believe that, in our own case and in the case of other adults and children, suffering is a misfortune. It would be as morally arbitrary to refuse to acknowledge that animal suffering is wrong a
The violinist case (and all of its variants)
In the violinist case, you are kidnapped and your kidneys are used to keep alive a violinist, who has a rare kidney disease. By unplugging, you let the violinist die, but you are not morally obligated to stay plugged into the violinist, even if unplugging
The human spores case
Contraception: you take precautions not to let spores get it but one still does, you are not obligated to raise this spore.
"People-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or u
The Henry Fonda case (and all of its variants)
If someone has a fatal illness and the only way they can be saved is with Henry Fonda, then Henry Fonda's still not morally obligated to help. This shows that having a right to life doesn't necessarily mean you have a right to anything that sustains your
Thomson's arguments that use the above cases
Violinist: in cases where the pregnancy is undesired through force such as rape, abortion is morally permissible
Henry Fonda: having a right to life doesn't necessarily mean that you have a right to anything that sustains your life
Human spores: in cases
Hedonism
The idea that what is good for you is pleasure (happiness) and what is bad for you is pain (unhappiness)
Preference Hedonism
A popular view of pleasure/happiness is that all pleasures have some experiential feature in common. They all feel the same way. However, Parfit thinks this should be rejected and replaced with the idea that pleasures are the states of experiences as spec
The desire-satisfaction view of welfare
The simplest is the Unrestricted Theory. This claims that what is best for someone is what would best fulfill all of his desires, throughout his life. Suppose that I meet a stranger who has what is believed to be a fatal disease. My sympathy is aroused,
The Success Theory (from Parfit)
The theory holds that the only desires that are relevant are the desires that are about your own life. The best life for the success theorist is the one where the strongest desires you have about your own life are satisfied.
The objective list view of welfare
According to this theory, certain things are good or bad for people, whether or not these people would want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things. The good things might include moral goodness, rational activity, the development of one's abil
Parfit's stranger on the train case and the argument that uses it
Claim: What makes your life better is the satisfaction of all your desires. Parfit: You meet a stranger with a terminal illness and you want him to recover. He does, unbeknownst to you. This does not make your life better.
Parfit's hybrid theory of welfare
Three that Parfit talked about: objective list, desire-satisfaction theories (success theory), and hedonism
These three can be combined in order to find the combination that works best for you (incorporating things on an objective list and individual desi
The experience machine and the uses that Nozick puts it to
Nozick asks us to imagine a machine that could give us whatever desirable or pleasurable experiences we could want. Psychologists have figured out a way to stimulate a person's brain to induce pleasurable experiences that the subject could not distinguish
Nozick's diagnosis of why we have the intuitions we have to the experience machine case
There is a hypothesis as to why we think that there is more to the good life than having certain experiences which says that not only do we want to have certain experiences, we also want those experiences to have a certain causal history (we see the progr
The paradox of hedonism
It's plausible that your fundamental aim should be seeking pleasure given hedonism. However, aiming for getting pleasure isn't a very effective way of getting pleasure for most people. Thus, hedonism predicts that it's rational to aim at something that wo
The autonomy argument (from SL)
Basic thought: experiences caused in certain ways are not good for us.
1. If hedonism is true, then autonomy (having own will unlike in utopian cases) contributes to the good life only insofar as it leads to pleasure.
2. Autonomy sometimes directly contri
The shape of the life argument (from SL)
Basic thought: the order in which we have experiences matters.
1. If hedonism is true, then the overall quality of life depends entirely on the amount of pleasure and pain it contains.
2. The overall quality of a life does not entirely depend on the amoun
The connection to motivation arguments for the desire satisfaction view of welfare (from SL)
Basic thought: what is good and bad for us is up to us.
The view can explain why it is that we are always motivated to get what is good for us.
First Motivation Argument:
If x is truly good for you, then you will be motivated to get it as long as you know
SL's arguments against the necessity claim of desire-satisfactionism
Necessary: If X is good for you, then X fulfills one of your desires.
Against:
Getting something that you enjoy but had no antecedent desire for.
Frustrating someone's desires in ways that seem to make them better off.
SL's arguments against the sufficiency claim of desire-satisfactionism
Sufficient: If X fulfills one of your desires, then X is good for you.
Against:
Cases where desire is satisfied but it doesn't seem like one benefitted (ex. desires based on false beliefs)
Desires that aren't about your life.
SL's SUFFICIENT
and SUFFICIENT
*
Sufficient*: If X fulfills one of your informed desires, then X is good for you.
Sufficient**: If X fulfills one of your informed desires about your own life, then X is good for you.
SL's arguments against SUFFICIENT
and SUFFICIENT
*
Against *:
Desires that aren't about your life (just because an informed desire gets satisfied doesn't mean your life is better because it might not about your life)
Against **:
Disappointment cases (disappointed by a lack of satisfaction of things you wa
Consequentialism
An action is morally required just because it produces the best overall consequences.
The consequentialist holds that we can understand what's good and what's bad independently from what's right and wrong. Thus, a complete consequentialist view includes a
Utilitarianism
All that's good is human welfare and all that's bad is human suffering.
An act is right if it maximizes the good, good being net happiness.
Actual Consequentialism
All the consequences matter. This makes it difficult to get moral knowledge as it's hard to know what all the actual consequences will be.
Expected Consequentialism
The expected consequences matter. Expected consequences are easier to know about so moral knowledge will be easier to come by.
The argument against expected consequentialism in favor of actual consequentialism*
There are cases where the expected consequences of performing some act are very favorable even though in fact performing that act is a disaster.
There are cases where the expected consequences of some act are very bad even though it turns out brilliantly.
SL's response to the purported counterexamples to actual consequentialism
We should completely divorce what we are praiseworthy and blameworthy for and what is right and wrong. Praise and blame go with expected consequences. Right and wrong go with actual consequences. Praise and blame are a function of how much you respect wha
The three over demandingness objections to consequentialism
Deliberation : We always ought to deliberate about all of the consequences of our actions. ? Morality shouldn't require that we dedicate so much of our cognitive lives thinking about all of the consequences.
Motivation: We ought to care most about maximiz
The partiality problem for consequentialism
Morality is impartial so we are often morally required to thwart the interests of our nearest and dearest in order to promote the interests of complete strangers.
The nothing-always-wrong problem for consequentialism
Many considerations can be overridden in particular cases so there is nothing that is always wrong or always right. You can be required to do absolutely anything as long as it leads to the best outcome.
In the LeQuin story, the torture of the child is sup
Rule Consequentialism
An act is right just in case it is sanctioned by the set of rules that maximize goodness over the long run. This allows for some things to be always wrong (if they are never sanctioned by the rules).
The problem of alienation
Agents that live by impartial moral theories are alienated from certain values in virtue of being impartial.
Objective Consequentialism
You ought to do whatever leads to the best consequences, even if this requires rejecting subjective consequentialism.
Subjective Consequentialism
You ought to deliberate in a consequentialist way. You have to be fully oriented towards maximizing the good.
Sophisticated Consequentialism
The sophisticated consequentialist agent accepts objective consequentialism but rejects subjective consequentialism.
Railton's proposed solution to the alienation problem
To value one's intimates non-instrumentally and act well towards them for their own sake. This non-instrumental concern is sensitive to whether or not the relationship makes one happy. The sophisticated consequentialist is sensitive to whether or not the
The Universalizability Principle
An act is right if and only if its maxim is universalizable.
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
Kantian maxims
A maxim is universalizable if and only if everyone could act on that maxim and achieve the goal of the action.
The fanatic problem for The Universalizability Principle
A fanatic's maxim can be universalized, yet what he is doing is wrong. Therefore, universalizability is not sufficient for something to be right.
The fanatical gardener abides by the maxim that he will shoot anyone who comes on his lawn and wants it to be
The Principle of Humanity
One should always treat persons as ends and never as mere means.
Means, mere means, ends
To treat someone as an end is to act in a way that respects their dignity.
To treat someone as a means is to use them in order to further your own interests.
To treat someone as a mere means is to treat them as a means in a way that is not consistent with
Kantian dignity and what grounds it
Our rationality and autonomy ground our dignity. These qualities are priceless, they cannot be weighed against other goods or outweighed by them. Hence their moral power.
SL's problems with the Principle of Humanity
The notion of treating someone as an end is vague.
The principle doesn't determine what people deserve.
The justification of the principle turns on the claim that we are autonomous, but it's not clear that we are.
The principle assumes that the moral stat
Contradiction in conception
A way in which a maxim can give rise to a contradiction. Where the maxim, when universalized, is no longer a viable means to the end.
Contradiction in will
A way in which a maxim can give rise to a contradiction. Where the will of a person contradicts what the universalization of the maxim implies
The logical contradiction interpretation of contradictions in conception
On this interpretation, there is something like a logical impossibility in the universalization of the maxim, or in the system of nature in which the maxim is a natural law: if the maxim were universalized, the action or policy that it proposes would be i
The practical contradiction interpretation of contradictions in conception
The practical contradiction test focuses on whether one could achieve what one wanted to achieve if the maxim is universally willed. This means that acting on a maxim that cannot be universalized is unfair
Ends-in-themselves
Ends are ends in themselves when everyone is rationally compelled to be guided by them (when you must be guided by them no matter your inclinations). They have something like infinite value (they will always trump the value of other things).
Korsgaard's argument for why ends-in-themselves have infinite value (from Denis)
If there are categorical imperatives (unconditional binding moral obligations), then there are ends in themselves.
Figure out which things could be ends in themselves.
Objects of inclination (no)
Inclinations (no)
Nonrational creatures (no)
Rational creat
Jeske's brute theory of the justification of friendship
The brute theory holds (i) that we don't need any special justification for being friends with some people rather than others (can have arbitrary reasons) and (ii) the fact that someone is our friend gives us an intrinsic reason to continue to care about
Whiting's virtue theoretic theory of the justification of friendship
You are closest with your friends and therefore know them the best so you are in the best position to help them out and appreciate them; having friends helps you love humanity and not treat people as a means (semi-consequentialist).
Virtuous creatures pro
Jeske's argument that the brute theory captures morality's egalitarianism
Everyone's interests count equally. Brute theory motivated by the thought that no one deserves to be cared about more than anyone else- can pick friends for arbitrary reasons, if there were specific qualifications like virtue, background, education, etc.
Hursthouse's qualified agent view of rightness
An act is right if and only if it is what the virtuous agent would characteristically do.
Swanton objection- in what ways does the agent need to be qualified? Do they need to be ideally virtuous? Do they need have expertise and express the virtue to the h
Slote's agent-based view of rightness
An act is right if and only if it expresses a virtuous motive (or at least doesn't express a vicious motive)
Swanton objection- his view cannot make sense of the ways in which rightness comes apart from praiseworthiness or lack of blameworthiness
The virtuous act v. an act expressing virtue
Action from a state of virtue may not be virtuous because it misses the target of the virtue (done with virtuous/ good intent but the execution/ outcome was not as expected- a possible person with the ideal amount of a virtue but imperfect information abo
Swanton's target centered account of rightness
Swanton holds that an act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous. There is no algorithm, it is highly dependent on context. The be overall virtuous you must be more virtuous than vicious.
Intuitionism
The view that the moral stuff is non-natural (different kind of thing than what the sciences investigate)
Metaethical view (Scanton): we intuit the actual moral properties (rather than philosophical utilitarianism). We have intuitive access to moral princ
Philosophical Utilitarianism
Holds the most fundamental stuff is welfare. Links morality to motivation.
Contractualism
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.
Can explain why welfare
The connection between Contractualism and motivation
Because contractualism is a metaethical view that morality is about justifying something to other people, you will be motivated to conduct moral behaviors that align with this point of view
Error theory about morality
People believed in witches, but we don't believe in witches now, so people are curious as to how these types of theories came into being.
The central idea is about why we come to the moral theories that we do, even though there aren't objective facts in m
The Meaningful Hypothesis
We think that our moral thought and talk is supposed to refer to something in the real world (moral theory should be applied to something practical and meaningful)- semantic claim
Moral talk purports to be about something.
The Always False Hypothesis
All of our moral thoughts and assertions are false.The things our thoughts and assertions are about do not exist. - metaphysical claim
Objective moral properties
Objective moral properties are categorical (explicit and direct). They are intrinsically motivating. They are supposed to move one to heed their call just so long as one is acquainted with them. Mackie does not believe there are any categorical imperative
The argument from disagreement for the Always False Hypothesis
There is widespread disagreement about moral matters. The differences seem unresolvable because neither party of disagreement is being unreasonable and both have all the necessary information. This supports the idea there are no objective moral properties
The argument(s) from queerness for the Always False Hypothesis
The metaphysical oddness argument- there just can't be anything intrinsically motivating. Nothing in science has shown such a thing to exist. There is no object that science has discovered that mere exposure to will motivate action. Instead, there must al
The two ways moral observation and scientific observation are the same
1. in both cases we move directly from perceptions to beliefs- we believe existence of science stuff that we cannot see because it's explanatorily indispensable. Similarly, these moral properties are needed as explanation.
2. in both cases our observation
The purported explanatory difference between moral observation and scientific observation
Only in the scientific cases do we need to posit physical properties to explain our observations. We do not need to appeal to moral facts to explain our moral observations.
Science
Alpha particle ? vapor trail ? perception ? belief
Morality
Wrongness ? mo
Enoch's view of moral objectivity
Morality is mind-independent meaning the moral facts don't fundamentally depend on what we think or feel about morality. We are pre-theoretically committed to the objectivity of morality.
Enoch's three tests for seeing whether we are objectivists about morality
Spinach: If the joke works the subject matter is all about us, our responses, our likings, preferences, etc. (ex. subjective matters- being glad you do not like spinach because if you did then you would eat it and spinach is gross; not taking into account
Enoch's reply to the disagreement argument
Disagreement argument: if there are perfectly objective moral truths why is there so much disagreement about them? Shouldn't there be an eventual convergence on these objective truths? But instead there is so much irreconcilable disagreements in morality
Enoch's reply to the intolerance objection
Intolerance objection: People are likely to become dangerously intolerant if they believe in objective morality (ex. social reformers who fight against intolerance/ bigotry are inspired by the thought that their vision of justice was objectively correct).
Sher's Controversy principle
We disagree in moral matters with wide swaths of otherwise reasonable people.
Whatever moral beliefs we have, there are many people who disagree with them.
Sher's Contingency principle
If we were born in a different time, we might have very different moral beliefs. Therefore, moral beliefs are largely based on the time in which we are born. If we had different background we would have radically different moral views.
Sher's argument from Controversy and Contingency to skepticism about the justification of moral beliefs
Controversy and contingency defeat any justification we might have for holding our moral beliefs. Consider a moral disagreement you have with an otherwise reasonable friend. Suppose you remain steadfast in your view despite the fact your friend disagrees.
Sher's three options for responding to his skepticism
Argument against contingency: our backgrounds do not completely determine our views. We can submit our views to rational reflection. This raises the chance that our views would have evolved away from the alternative backgrounds.
Sher's response: if you st
The analogy between scientific observation and intuitions about cases
We can justify our use of intuitions in an analogous way to the way we justify our use of empirical observation when doing science. Empirical observations are the inputs into scientific theories. Intuitions play the same role in philosophical theorizing.
Kagan's argument against the epistemic value of intuitions about cases
Kagan is a huge consequentialist- it is good for consequentialists if we should not trust our intuition about cases. Kagan's problem with that analogy:
Unlike in the case of empirical observation, it is not clear that we have some sense organ whose functi
Moral standing
Moral standing indicates that someone's a relevant member of the moral community.
If you have moral standing you are morally relevant/ part of moral community. A member of the moral community's interests are taken into account when making moral decisions.
Moral equality v. factual equality
Moral equality is not grounded in factual equality. Racists and sexists try to point out differences in capacity as justification. There is no capacity that all people are equal at. Some argue that races and sexes balance out as equal (average abilities o
Singer's view of moral standing
Anything with interests have moral standing and are thus due equal moral consideration. Being able to feel pleasure and pain is sufficient for having an interest. Since non-human animals feel pleasure and pain, all these creatures have moral standing. Any
Singer's argument that many of us are speciesist
Attempting to block non-human animals is speciesist which is morally objectionable in the same way that racism and sexism are (doesn't give equal weight to interests). Necessary premise that we treat animals' interests unequally. Many of our practices see
The features of Scheffler's standard cases
Cases where someone maims or kills more or less arbitrarily chosen people to induce fear in a broader range of people in order to destroy or destabilize some social structure.
Terrorism v. state terror
State terror is conducted by the state against foreigners or their own people. Acts can be covertly or by open terror bombing during a war. Violence in state terror is used to maintain structure, whereas terrorism is used to destabilize the system and des
The anatomy of Scheffler's standard cases
Terrorism is distinctly different than other violent acts. It sets off a moral cascade, not only do terrorists harm those they maim and kill, they intentionally harm the wider group by intentionally inducing fear. They try to make people afraid of doing d