Ethics Terms

Singer's weak principle

If we can prevent something bad without giving up something of significant moral importance, we are morally required to prevent that bad thing.

Singer's strong principle

If we can prevent something bad without giving up something of comparable moral importance, we are morally required to prevent that bad thing.

The Pond Case-Singer

Child drowning in the pond, you are morally obligated to jump in and save him because getting your clothes wet is not morally significant. Proximity and # don't lessen the obligation

Singer's argument for why we should donate

We can prevent suffering in the third world without sacrificing something of comparable/significant moral importance by giving money to aid organizations

Moral Code (Arthur)

-What we collectively believe about morality
-a system of principles, rules and other standards designed to guide people's conduct

Ideal Moral Code (Arthur)

-the moral code that, when recognized and taught by members of society, would have the best consequences
-an act is right if and only if the ideal moral code says its right
-contains entitlements, but not greater moral evil principle

Arthur's ideal code consequentialism

there would be certain bad consequences that if we adopted the greater moral evil principle that would outweigh the good consequences of adopting it

Arthur's argument that we should drop Singer's principles

1. Entitlements
2. Just Deserts
3. Negative/Positive Rights
4. Few would follow rules so few would feel guilt
5. Need a code that doesn't demand too much

Moral vs. Biological persons (Tooley)

a. Traditional debate about abortion: are fetuses moral persons?
i. If they are, have right to life ? wrong to kill them
b. Moral persons have adult human rights (including right to life)

Why biological personhood is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral personhood (Tooley)

a. Intelligent Martians, human cancer cells don't have right to life

Tooley's argument that fetuses are not moral persons

a. In order to have the right to life, you have to desire that you continue to exist the way you do now
b. Fetuses/infants can't have this desire: lack concepts necessary for having this desire ? lack desire = don't have right to life
c. "possess a the co

The Potentiality Principle (Tooley)

a. If organism O has the potential to grow into an organism that clearly has a right to life through normal development, then O currently has a right to life (conservative argument)
i. Fetuses therefore always have a right to life

Tooley's Moral symmetry principle

a. Suppose that the causal process C leads to outcome E. A is an action that initiates C, whereas B is an action that requires minimal effort that stops process C before E obtains
b. There is no morally relevant difference between refraining from doing A

Tooley's cats/super-cats example

a. Super-cats have right to life but regular cats don't: Cuddles injected but not super-cat yet
i. Potentiality principle: Cuddles has right to life
ii. Moral symmetry principle: permissible not to inject Cuddles, therefore also permissible to kill Cuddle

Tooley's argument against the potentiality principle

a. This conclusion invalidates potentiality principle: can't use to show fetuses have right to life
b. It's okay not to get pregnant ? also permitted to interfere with process?

FLO Theory of Wrongful Killing (Marquis)

a. Focuses on wrongness of killing rather than right to life
b. Person who is killed is wronged by killing
c. Killing wrong when person deprived of something valuable: future like ours (valuable future conscious life)

Considered Judgement argument (Marquis)

The nature of misfortune of death: impending loss of FLO makes premature death a misfortune (AIDS victim example)

Worst of crimes argument (Marquis)

Explains why killing = worst of crimes: deprives person of all value of future, not just part of it (like a robbery)

appeal to cases argument (Marquis)

a. Permanently comatose vs. temporarily unconscious
i. Killing comatose not wrong since no possibility for FLO
ii. Temporarily unconscious have FLO - wrong to kill
b. Euthanasia justified with FLO argument
c. Aiding suicidal not justified: must have flow,

analogy with animals argument (Marquis)

a. Inflicting suffering = bad no matter who it's inflicted on (including animals)
b. Animal welfare matters (FLO) same for fetuses

violinist case (Thomson)

a. Fetus = person from moment of conception
b. Abortion still often permissible even if fetus has right to life
c. Kidnapped/plugged into violinist: analogous to rape
i. Someone's right to use one's body as wished > right to life
d. You will die if you do

human spores case (Thomson)

a. Analogous to consensual sex
b. Intentionally opening window doesn't give burglar right to stay in your house
c. Permissible to vacuum up human seeds even if you opened your windows
i. Abortion sometimes permissible after consensual sex

Henry Fonda case (Thomson)

a. Henry Fonda necessary to keep alive ? not req
i. Right to life doesn't entitle one to bare min to keep one alive
b. Right not to be killed (unjustly): original violinist case disproves this
i. Also highlights weakness in conservative argument

Thomson's arguments

a. Abortion is sometimes permissible - not always, fetus's interests are still relevant: have right to life from conception, but sometimes right to use one's body > right to life

Hedonism (Parfit)

a. What is good for you is pleasure (happiness)
b. What is bad for you is pain (not-happiness)

Preference Hedonism (Parfit)

a. What's good for you: states you experience as wanted
b. What's bad for you: states you experience as not-wanted

Desire-Satisfaction view of welfare (Parfit)

a. What's good for you = satisfaction of your desires
b. What's bad for you = frustration of your desires

Success Theory (Parfit)

a. Only relevant desires = desires about your own life

Objective list view of welfare (Parfit)

a. What's good for you = getting things that are independently valuable
b. What's bad for you = getting things that are independently disvaluable (or not getting independently valuable things)

Parfit's Stranger on the train case (and argument that uses it)

a. Unrestricted desire-fulfillment: all desires are relevant to welfare
b. Stranger on a train has a fatal disease, you want him to be cured
i. You forget about him, much later he is cured: unrestricted desire-fulfillment theory says your life is better
i

Parfit's hybrid theory of welfare

a. What's good for you = things on list you want for your own life/things you take pleasure in
b. Advantage of components without the problems?

Experience Machine (Nozick)

Hedonist claim: all that matters is having certain pleasures
b. Pre-program/plug into experience machine for 2 years at a time
i. Nozick: plugging in = abhorrent
1. We want to do certain things
2. We want to be certain types of people
3. Limiting ourselve

Nozick's diagnosis of why we have the intuitions we have to the experience machine case

a. We want our experiences, characters, actions to have a certain causal history

Paradox of hedonism (SL)

a. Predicts we should aim for pleasure, but won't get us what is fundamentally important (won't get pleasure if single-mindedly pursuing)
i. Pleasure not only thing that makes us directly better off?

autonomy argument (SL)

a. Similar to experience machine: experiences caused in certain way not good for us
b. Brave New World example: lack autonomy, don't shape own lives
i. Hedonist argument: autonomy good only if it leads to pleasure
ii. Autonomy contributes to good life eve

shape of the life argument (SL)

a. Order in which we have experiences matter
i. Life not just about amount of pleasure pain (hedonism): order matters (ex: Einstein good then bad ? worse than bad then good?)
ii. Hedonism is false

Connection to motivation arguments for the desire satisfaction view of welfare (SL)

a. We can decide what is good/bad for us
i. Good way to encompass bizarre cases
b. Explains wide diversity of good lives
c. Explains type of authority we have over what's good for us
d. Avoids objective list issues
e. Explain why we're always motivated to

SL's arguments against necessity claim of desire-satisfactionism

a. Necessary: If X is good for you, then X fulfills one of your desires
b. Argument: pleasant surprise with no previous desire, frustrating desire to make you better off
i. Making kids eat vegetables even if they don't like them

SL's arguments against the sufficiency claim of desire-satisfactionism

a. Sufficient: If X fulfills one of your desires, then X is good for you
b. Argument: when desire fulfilled but one not benefitted (not about your own life)

SL's sufficient
and sufficient
*

a. SUFFICIENT* � If X fulfills one of your informed desires, then X is good for you
b. SUFFICIENT** � If X fulfills one of your informed desires about your own life, then X is good for you

SL's arguments against sufficient
and sufficient
*

a. Disappointment, ignorance, incoherence of wanted self-harm, deficient desire cases
i. Ex: famous musician, stranger on train, want to kill self = strongest desire (deficient desire?)

Consequentialism (SL)

What's good brings about the best consequences
a. What's good/bad for us is independent of what's right/wrong
i. Theory includes what's good/bad
b. What's right = promoting what's good
c. Why morality is impartial
d. Ubiquity of considerations being overr

Utilitarianism (SL)

a. Good = human welfare
b. Bad = human suffering
c. An act is right when it maximizes the good
i. Not necessarily to largest number of people
1. Huge good for few people
ii. Not necessarily to create largest amount of good
1. Sometimes making lots of good

Actual consequentialism (SL)

-Way to evaluate life as good or bad
a. Actual consequences matter: all consequences matter
i. Hard to know all consequences ? hard to get moral knowledge

expected consequentialism (SL)

-Way to make decisions
a. Expected consequences matter
i. Expected consequences easier to know ? easier to get moral knowledge

argument against expected consequentialism (in favor of actual) (SL)

a. Expected consequences favorable even though doing act = bad
b. Expected consequences bad even though results of doing = good
c. Doesn't capture basic motivating thought behind consequentialism (reason behind action)

SL's response to the purported counterexamples to actual consequentialism

a. Completely separate praiseworthy/blameworthy and right/wrong
i. Praise and blame go with expected consequences
ii. Right and wrong go with actual consequences
iii. Praise and blame depend on what you think is fundamentally important

3 overdemandingness objections to consequentialism (SL)

a. Deliberation
i. Should consider all consequences of our actions
1. Good rules of thumb to max good
2. Theory doesn't predict: couldn't do a good job max good if we spent so much time deliberating possible consequences
b. Motivation
i. Should care most

Partiality problem for consequentialism (SL)

a. Often morally required to thwart interests of close ones to promote interests of complete strangers
i. Ex: Son needs simple surgery vs. helping distant starving people

Nothing-always-wrong problem for consequentialism (SL)

a. Can be required to do anything as long as it leads to best outcome
i. Ex: Omelas, exemplary punishment (shoot random soldier to gain universal compliance)
b. No action morally sacred if it brings about net best overall consequences

Rule consequentialism (SL)

a. Act is right only when sanctioned by rules that max goodness over long run
i. Some things always wrong (things never sanctioned by rules)
b. Few accept this: rule fetish objection
i. Required to follow rules even when you know breaking rule ? lead to m

the problem of alienation (Railton)

a. People who live by impartial moral theories are alienated from certain values in virtue of being impartial
i. John example: takes care of Anne to maximize best consequences
ii. Alienated/impersonal reasons - cares about her for wrong reasons, not perso

Objective consequentialism (Railton)

a. Do what leads to best consequences even if you have to be fully oriented towards maximizing good

subjective consequentialism (Railton)

a. Fully oriented towards max good

sophisticated consequentialism (Railton)

a. Accept objective consequentialism, reject subjective consequentialism

Railton's proposed solution to the alienation problem

a. Be a sophisticated consequentialist
i. Treat people non-instrumentally (value for their own sake)
ii. Be sensitive to whether or not relationship is beneficial to general good
1. Ceases to be beneficial ? end relationship
iii. Juan not alienated from L

Universalizability Principle (SL/Kant)

a. An act is only right if and only if its maxim is universalizable
i. Incoherent if you make an exception for yourself

Kantian Maxims

a. Principle that one acts upon
i. What to be done
ii. Why that is to be done
b. Actions rightness/wrongness dependent on why we did them ? nonconsequentialist (tied to maxim): not all maxims good

Kantian universalizability

a. A maxim is universalizable if and only if everyone could act on that maxim and achieve the goal of the action
i. Ex: promise to repay money but never do: if everyone did this, no one would lend money ? not universalizable

fanatic problem for Universalizability principle (Kant)

a. Fanatical enough ? maxim can be universalizable
i. Ex: Gardner who kills to maintain beauty of lawn: universalizable but not sufficient (bad maxim)

Principle of Humanity (Kant)

a. One should always treat persons as ends and never as mere means
b. Everyone has dignity that demands respect
c. Why fanatic, exploitative action, paternalism wrong, explains autonomous?hopeful, universal human rights, praise/blame, justified punishment

Means, mere means, ends (Kant)

a. Ends: Act in a way that respects their dignity
b. Means: Use them in order to further your own interests
c. Mere means: Treat someone as means without respecting their dignity

Kantian dignity and what grounds it

a. We are rational and autonomous ? grounds our dignity
b. Qualities priceless - can't be outweighed

SL's problems with the Principle of Humanity

a. Treating someone as an end = vague
b. What do people deserve?
c. Are we autonomous?
d. Moral luck (things we can't control)?
e. Why do those who lack autonomy/rationality deserve respect?

Contradiction in conception (Korsgaard/Kant)

a. World where maxim is universally willed isn't coherent

contradiction in will (Korsgaard/Kant)

a. Universally willing a maxim contradicts aim essential to willing itself (about Kantian deontology)

logical contradiction interpretation of contradictions in conception (Korsgaard)

a. Lying promise give evidence
i. Logically impossible for everyone to make this promise
b. Conventions wouldn't survive universal willing of the relevant maxims
c. This kind of world impossible where maxim universally willed

practical contradiction interpretation of contradictions in conception (Korsgaard)

a. Could one achieve goal if maxim universally willed?
b. Acting on non-universalizable maxim = unfair

perfect and imperfect duties (Denis)

a. Perfect duty: demands universal compliance
i. Ex: not to murder
ii. Demands of justice
b. Imperfect duty: does not demand universal compliance
i. Ex: Giving to charity
ii. Duties of beneficence (active goodness/kindness)
c. Duty to not treat people as

ends-in-themselves (Denis)

-ends are objects that guide our actions in certain ways
-ends are ends in themselves if everyone is rationally compelled to be guided by them no matter their inclinations

Korsgaard's argument for why ends-in-themselves have infinite value (from Denis)

-rational actions have certain types of conditional value
-needs to be some kind of unconditional value in order for rational actions to have value
-Humanity (capacity to set ends) is the natural place to find unconditional value

Jeske's brute theory of the justification of friendship

a. Don't need special justification for being friends with some instead of others
b. The fact that someone is our friend gives us intrinsic reason to care about them

Whitting's virtue-theoretic theory of the justification of friendship

a. Being close to friends puts you in a better position to appreciate values ? looks instrumental (seems consequentialist/Kantian)
b. Friends need to have virtuous features to justify as friend
c. Friends' welfares entwined?caring for them/promoting their

Jeske's argument that the brute theory captures morality's egalitarianism

a. Not objectionably self-regarding
i. One must continue to be friends, not giving enough attention to individuals
b. Not objectionably parochial (limited, narrow)
c. No one deserves to be cared about more than anyone else - everyone's welfare matters to

Hurthouse's qualified agent view of rightness

a. Virtue ethics: Character is more fundamental than rightness/wrongness
b. An act is only right if and only if it is what the virtuous agent would characteristically do
i. Does qualified agent need to be ideally virtuous?

Slote's agent-based view of rightness

a. An act is right if and only if it expresses a virtuous motive (or doesn't express a vicious one)
i. Can't explain how rightness comes apart from praiseworthiness/lack of blameworthiness

The virtuous act v. an act expressing virtue (Swanton)

a. Virtuous act: can perform virtuous act without expressing virtue
i. Very contextual
ii. Criminal can accidentally do right thing - virtuous act
b. Act expressing virtue: reflects intentions of act - must be virtuous
i. Act from virtue not virtuous if i

Swanton's target centered account of rightness

a. An act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous
i. Hard to predict - dependent on context

Intuitionism (Scanlon)

a. Moral stuff is non-natural (different from the kind of stuff that science investigates)
b. How does this account for connection between morality and motivation?

Philosophical Utilitarianism (Scanlon)

a. The most fundamental stuff is welfare
b. Can account for connection between morality and motivation

Contractualism (Scanlon)

a. Act wrong if disallowed under certain set of rules which no one could reasonably reject

Connection between Contractualism and motivation (Scanlon)

a. Morality important (mandatory) - important to be able to justify ourselves to other people
b. Contractualism defends this - wrong acts will be the acts we can't justify to all people

Error theory about morality (Mackie)

a. 2 parts: semantic and metaphysical claim
i. The Meaningful Hypothesis
ii. The Always False Hypothesis

Meaningful Hypothesis (Mackie)

a. Our moral thought and talk is meaningful - it purports to be about something

Always false hypothesis (Mackie)

a. All of our moral thoughts/assertions are false
b. Argument from disagreement
c. Argument from queerness

objective moral properties (Mackie)

a. Objective Meaningful Hypothesis
i. Moral thought/talk is meaningful and attempts to refer to objective moral properties
b. Categorical
c. Intrinsically motivating: one moved to do them if one is familiar with them

Argument from disagreement for the Always False Hypothesis (Mackie)

a. Reasonable people disagree on irresolvable moral manners (supposed to be objective)
b. Can't be an objective truth if irresolvable but reasonable
c. Popular argument against objective
d. Ex: abortion
i. No clear method to solve this disagreement

Arguments from queerness for the Always False Hypothesis (Mackie)

a. Metaphysical queerness
i. Too spooky (unlike science)
b. Epistemic queerness (knowledge/conditions for acquiring it)
i. If there were properties that are intrinsically motivating, we couldn't have contact with them
c. Faculty of intuition

Two ways moral observation and scientific observation are the same (Harman)

a. Can we confirm/gain evidence for or disconfirm moral claims through observation? -- there are relative moral facts, ways science and morality are similar and different: concept of circular
b. In both we move directly from observation to belief
i. Ex: w

Purported explanatory difference between moral observation and scientific observation (Harman)

a. Must appeal to scientific facts to explain scientific observations
b. Don't need to appeal to moral facts to explain moral observations
i. Ex: cloud chamber case (use knowledge of scientific facts to explain alpha particle w/o actually being able to se

Enoch's view of moral objectivity

a. Moral facts don't depend on what we think or feel: mind-independent
b. Goal: Show we are pre-theoretically committed to objectivity of morality

Enoch's three tests for seeing whether we are objectivists about morality

a. The spinach test
i. Child dislikes spinach (confused)
ii. Earth revolving around sun in Middle Ages wrong (student not confused)
iii. Moral: Slavery wrong in 19th Century South (student not confused)
1. Slavery case more like Earth case because astrono

Enoch's reply to the disagreement argument

a. Argument: No way to show who is wrong ? lack of convergence
i. Prudential reasons to support views
ii. Not all disagreement undermines objectivity
iii. Self-defeat

Enoch's reply to the intolerance objection

people will become intolerant if they believe in objective facts about morality
a. No formula to determine who is right
b. Underlying thoughts that motivate intolerance support objectivity

Sher's Controversy Principle

a. We disagree with reasonable people about moral matters

Sher's contingency principle

a. If we had different backgrounds, we would have different moral views

Sher's argument from controversy and contingency to skepticism about the justification of moral beliefs

a. These defeat any justification we might have for holding our moral views
b. Contingency: it's an accident that you hold your own view vs. the other side's view (your background) ? your views don't track the truth, then why are they better?

Sher's three options for responding to his skepticism

a. Reevaluate evidence for moral views to further justify them
b. Give up justifying, accept you can't act rationally on your moral beliefs
c. Sher supports: Give up justifying but can still action rationally based on your moral beliefs

The analogy between scientific observation and intuitions about cases (Kagan)

a. Using our intuitions = analogous to using empirical observation in science
i. Science: empirical observations are inputs into scientific theories
1. Theory must be able to predict empirical observations (why we think of e observations as inputs into th

Kagan's argument against the epistemic value of intuitions about cases

a. Don't have a sense organ to track moral truths - why trust our intuitions?
i. If we have eyes for empirical observations for sight, what for moral?
b. Can stick by our intuitions only if we can systematize them
c. No moral theory can systematize and vi

moral standing (Singer)

a. Any creature that can feel pain has moral standing ? morally relevant
i. Need some positive reason to justify causing them harm
ii. Being able to feel pleasure/pain sufficient for having moral standing

moral equality vs. factual equality (Singer)

a. Moral equality not grounded in factual equality
b. Factual equality - based on facts (such as men can't have abortions therefore don't have right to have an abortion?)
c. Moral equality - gives equal weight to interests, my like pain = your like pain

Singer's view of moral standing

a. Can feel pleasure/pain ? have moral standing, therefore must have good reason to cause pain
b. Treat = interests =

Singer's argument that many of us are speciesist

a. We treat animals' interests unequally
b. Wouldn't do many of same practices (cruel) to humans
c. Objectionable like racism or sexism - treats creatures who deserve equal treatment unequally
d. Remember different sized glasses from recitation example (d

the features of Scheffler's standard cases

someone maims or kills more or less arbitrarily chosen people to induce fear in a broader range of people in order to destroy or destabilize an existing social order

terrorism vs. state terror (Scheffler)

state terror-a state harming members of its own population in order to spread fear that will undermine social order and to prevent the emergence of opposing social forces (preserving established order)

the anatomy of Scheffler's standard cases

-something distinctively wrong with terrorism
-terrorism has different moral anatomy because it sets off a moral cascade (harm not only those they maim and kill, but wider group by intentionally inducing fear)