Natural law
a law of nature which describes how certain things always and everywhere behave.
(For example, the Law of Gravity)
A law is deterministic
if given some state, the law dictates that a single subsequent state must result.
(for example, the Law of Gravity, Newton's laws of motion.)
A law is indeterministic
if given some state, there are many subsequent states compatible with the law
Determinism:
All the laws of the universe are deterministic.
Determinism implies that given an initial state of the universe (say, the big bang -theory-) there is only one possible way the universe could turn out over all time. Determinism implies the future is comple
But don't we know some laws are indeterministic laws?
(A) Not quite. Interpretations of, say, quantum mechanics remain controversial to some extent.
(B) Even if quantum mechanics introduces indeterminacy into the world, it's unclear that our actions being indeterminate rather than determinate is easier to sq
Compatibilism
the view that determinism and free will are compatible.
Being able to change something
(Even if all laws of the universe were deterministic, so the future was determined by the past, we could still be free).
A standard compatibilist analysis for being free to do an action
� You are free to do X if and only if
(1) you have the power or ability to do X, and
(2) there are no constraints or impediments preventing you from doing X.
An important aspect of our ordinary conception of acting freely is being able to do otherwise. Th
Determinism and The Compatibilist's Analysis of Freedom
The point of the compatibilist's analysis of freedom is to make free will compatible with determinism.
Consider two possible timelines: the actual timeline T (the course of events that actually occur) and a hypothetical timeline T*
The Consequence Argument for Compatibilism
**
1. Their analysis seems to do a good job classifying cases of unfree action.
a. If you're in prison, you're not free: you couldn't leave if you wanted to.
b. If someone coerces you with severe enough limitations (death) you're not free: you couldn't ha
The Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism
The Consequence Argument:
(1) What happens next is a necessary consequence of the past and the laws of nature.
(2) I can't change the past.
(3) I can't change the laws of nature.
(4) I can't change the fact that what happens next is a necessary consequenc
Incompatibilism.
Genuine free will cannot exist if determinism is true
Counterexamples to the Compatibilist's Analysis
Recall:
The Consequence Argument
(1) What happens next is a necessary consequence of the past and the laws of
nature.
(2) I can't change the past.
(3) I can't change the laws of nature.
(4) I can't change th
And to make the argument valid we needed:
(?) If we can't change X or that Y necessarily follows from X, then we can't change Y.
The classical compatibilist blocks the argument by claiming
I could do X (freely) if and only if If I had wanted/chosen to do
New" Compatibilism
In response to these problems, some compatibilists "refine" their analysis. A general strategy: keep the conditional form of the analysis, but change what free action, or power to choose is conditional on. So in general...we "think we
I could have done X if and only if: If ... ... ..., I would have done X.
The only problem is: what goes in for the blank? A very interesting recent suggestion involves appealing to what we "think we have reason to do". That is,
Reason-Responsive Compatibi
Modus Ponens
If A, then B
A
? B
Modus Tollens
If A, then B
B is false.
? A is false
Reductio Ad Absurdum
The name of this argument form is Latin for "reduction to the absurd".
The motivating idea behind reductio is that if a sentence implies a falsehood, then that sentence must be false.
In a reductio ad absurdum, we presuppose a claim that we wish to refute
Libertarianism:
Free will is incompatible with determinism, but we are
nonetheless free. (incompatabilism is true, and determinism is false).
Virtues: has the potential to capture a "deep" kind of freedom�one on which we could be responsible for our very characters, disp
View 1�Simple Libertarianism
An action is free simply if it is an undetermined action. Something's being undetermined doesn't mean it's free
View 2�"Extra Factor" Libertarianism
there is some "extra factor" standing outside the normal causal order whose operation accounts for the difference between free and unfree action.
The idea is that it is not the fact that our actions are undetermined that makes them free. Rather, that inde
Skepticism About Free Will
� Hard Determinism: Incompatibilism is true (free will is incompatible with determinism) and determinism is true, so we don't have free will.
This is a version of...
� Skepticism (about free will): we don't have free will.
Three routes to skepticism
(A) Incompatibilism + Determinism
First argue for Incompatibilism (using, say, the Consequence Argument).
Then check with the scientists to make sure determinism is true.
(B) Failures of Compatibilism and Libertarianism
Argue that compatibilism fails beca
Regress arguments
Philosophers like Galen Strawson have claimed that the kind of freedom that we think we have requires us to be ultimately responsible for our actions in a way that turns out to be impossible. In particular, suppose you think:
You aren't responsible for an
Hard Determinism and Skepticism: Living without Freedom
What if we don't have free will? What would follow? It seems:
(A) We should never take pride in anything we had done or think anyone deserved a reward.
(B) We should never feel guilty and no one is ever blameworthy for the bad things they do.
This raises
Transeunt causation
The kind of causation that occurs between events or occurrences.
Claim
All events or occurrences have prior causes.
Agent-causation
The kind of causation that occurs between an agent and an event.
Objections to Agent-Causation
Objection: We have no reason to think that our actions are agentially, rather than transeuntly, caused.
Objection: Agent-causation doesn't solve the worry that undetermined actions aremerely random.
The agent-causalist
proposes the agent as the "extra-factor" that, according to extra-factor views, is responsible for free action.
Philosophical Analysis
To clarify or address a philosophical problem sometimes philosophers give an "analysis" of some word or concept.
One reason it can be useful to begin a philosophical debate with analyses of key terms is that the success of certain arguments depends on how
A stipulative definition
of a word is an announcement as to how one plans to use that word.
An analysis of a word (or concept)
is an attempt to clarify how it is already used or how it should be used.
In an analysis, the concept to be analyzed is called the analysandum. The part that serves to analyze is the
analysans.
In an analysis, the concept to be analyzed is called the
analysandum
The part that serves to analyze is the
analysans
whenever B is the case A must be as well.
A is a necessary condition for B =
#NAME?
A is a sufficient condition for B
What does an analysis require?
An analysis requires giving both necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept. B if only if A.
An analysis requires giving necessary and sufficient conditions that are informative about its analysandum .
How can an analysis be uninformative?
One way is for the analysandum to be a re-statement of the analysans , whether with the same or different wording. For example:
An object is red if and only if it is red.
A work of art is beautiful if and only if it excels in regards to beauty.
Another wa
Adding indeterminacy....
doesn't seem to help free action. In fact, we seem to have plenty of good reasons to think that it might even hinder free action. The Libertarian owes us an explanation which avoids both of these problems. What we've seen is that it's not at all obvious w
Another issue for libertarianism: where does indeterminacy supposedly enter into human action?
(1) in development of our characters and desires. [too early?]
(2) during deliberation. [still too early?]
(3) between deliberation and our choices. [not helping freedom?]
reactive attitudes
blame, resentment, reward, guilt, shame, pride
mitigate responsibility
The less free you are, the less responsibility you have:
- It often seems unreasonable to punish you for things you did unfreely.
- It also seems reasonable to some extent to suspend reactive attitudes like:
blame, resentment, reward, guilt, shame, pride
Freedom in the "deeper" sense
A compatibilist response:
1.Freedom in the "deeper" senserequires that there could have been two possible outcomes given the same past.
?2.Freedom in the "deeper sense" requires that you could go through the same deliberations, thought processes, desires,
Further Requirements on Analysis
While philosophical analyses should give necessary and sufficient conditions, not just any such conditions will do. (Providing necessary and sufficient conditions is necessary but not sufficient
for a successful analysis.
Counterexamples to philosophical analysis
Usually analyses of philosophical concepts are pretty tough to give.
This is because a proposed analysis of A into B may have counterexamples, i.e. possible scenario s which show something is an A without being a B or vice versa . Note that a possible
sce
Proof by Cases
Either A is true or B is true.
If A , then C
If B , then C
? C.
Both cases C is true
Reductio and Counter- Examples
When we give a counter-example to an analysis, we're actually giving a reductio argument showing the falsity of the analysis.
We typically think of undetermined actions as
random,capricious, inexplicable, uncontrolled, or irrational.
So why is supposing that our actions are undetermined as opposed to determined supposed to help explain free will?